
60 YEARS OF UEF

In an extremely concise presentation of the UEF's sixty years of activity, its history can be divided into eight main phases:

1. Foundation and Definition of Fundamental Principles (1946-1949)

There are five fundamental aspects to be underlined here, the first of which is represented by the *federalist choice*, i.e. the conviction that irreversible and democratic European unity can only be achieved through the construction of a federal state. With regard to this concept, the UEF has always opposed the *confederalist choice*, which was once represented by Churchill. It was defined as unionist, and would later find its most authoritative exponent in de Gaulle and in Margareth Thatcher. The federalist choice, which emerged from the Hertenstein convention on September 15th-22nd 1946 and again at the moment of the UEF's official foundation in Paris on December 15th of the same year, has been the fundamental element of the UEF's identity ever since. This did not, however, prevent the participation of the federalists together with the confederalists in the Congress of the Hague (May 7th-10th 1948), and the subsequent constitution of the European Movement, which included virtually all existing organisations in favour of European unity. Initially dominated by confederalist tendencies, the EM would subsequently be guided, starting with the presidency of Paul-Henri Spaak (1899-1972) in 1950, by predominantly federalist principles. This line would be supported in particular, apart from the UEF and the Jeunesses Fédéralistes Europeennes (JEF), which was strictly linked to it, by the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), the European Association of Teachers (AEDE), the *Fédération Internationale des Maisons d'Europe* (FIME) and the European International Training Centre (CIFE). A substantially confederal (confederalist) position would be taken, with regard to the movements for European unity, by the Paneuropa movement of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972).

The second cornerstone of UEF policy was and is represented by the conception of *European unity as a fundamental stage and decisive impulse towards world unity*. The idea of "United Europe in a united world" in essence means identifying in the Kantian universal peace the ultimate objective of the federalist struggle and rejecting any kind of Pan-European nationalism. This orientation could not be translated for a long time into a link with the world federalist organisation, since they themselves were against regional unification. However, the situation began to change in 1980, and in the end, on the occasion of the 20th UEF Congress (Genoa, March 19th-21st 2004), the decision was made to join the World Federalist Movement.

The third relevant aspect of the general orientation of the UEF is *the relationship between integral federalist thinking and that of institutional federalism*. The former derives from the teachings of Pierre Joseph Proudhon, and its greatest exponent from within the UEF was the Frenchman of Russian origin Alexandre Marc (1904-2000), the organisation's first general secretary. Integral federalism, which carried significant weight during the early years of the UEF, is fundamentally characterised by the conviction that the federal system's basic components must include not only entities of a territorial nature (from municipalities to unions of states), but also those of a

functional and professional nature. The institutionalists' guiding light was Alexander Hamilton (federal state theorist and one of the founding fathers of the United States of America, the first federal state in history), while Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986) was their main point of reference in the UEF. According to this school of thought, the constituent units of the federal system can only be institutions of a territorial nature. Institutional orientation acquired significant weight in the UEF starting from 1949, and it gave prevalence to the principle according to which the federalist organisation must propose to gather all those who are in favour of European federation, even if they have different ideological orientations, as long as they are compatible with democratic principles.

It should be emphasised that integral federalist principles have nevertheless remained a significant component of the UEF's theoretical framework. In particular, they have provided an important contribution to the definition of the European socioeconomic model which hinges on the synthesis between competitiveness and solidarity (the social market economy referred to in the Lisbon Treaty). This makes it original and different with respect to the American model and the collectivist socioeconomic model. Above all, the principles of minimum social guarantees and obligatory community service should be remembered in this respect, being formulated by integral federalists as early as the 1930s.

The fourth aspect to be remembered with reference to the general orientation of the UEF is the *idea of a united Europe as a mediating force between the USA and the USSR*. This underlines in general the contribution that European unification was called upon to make towards peace not only in Europe, but throughout the world, and it particularly expressed the will to contrast the division of Europe into opposing blocks and the outbreak of the cold war. In this regard, there was an evolution, starting with the first congress of the UEF held in Montreux between August 27th and 30th 1947, which was expressed by the "*Start in the West*" formula, coined by Dutchman Henri Brugmans (1906-1997), the first president of the UEF's executive office (UEF president) and rector of the College of Europe in Bruges between 1950 and 1972. This concept took into account that the formation of blocks was an objective consequence of the collapse of Europe and of the formation of a bipolar system dominated by two superpowers. At the same time it became clear that the unification of Europe could only be commenced within the area of western influence, because in that framework the hegemonic system was less rigid and the leading American power expressed support for European integration through the Marshall Plan, in function of the policy of containing the USSR. It was specified, on the other hand, that if supranational unity was pursued with determination in Western Europe, it would alter the East-West equilibrium, put the Soviet block in crisis and pave the way for the unification of the whole of Europe. The validity of this set-up was confirmed by the historical process and the European Union now expresses an orientation towards a more equal partnership with the USA and an autonomous and incisive role for world peace.

This emerges most notably in the document "A Secure Europe in a Better World", approved by the European Council in 2004 (2003) after a proposal from the High Representative for Common Security and Foreign Policy, Javier Solana. Rapid progress towards complete federation on the other hand is the essential condition for the EU to be able to effectively pursue this orientation.

The fifth aspect to be considered is ultimately represented by the *strategic line of the UEF*. It can be said that in 1949, the UEF defined, fundamentally on the basis of Spinelli's observations, a direction which has constituted ever since the driving force behind the strategies employed in the struggle for European federation, despite alterations being made to adapt to concrete political situations.

In this regard, there are four fundamental elements to highlight:

- National democratic governments are both a means for and obstacles to European unification. They are a means in the sense that they are forced by the historical crisis of the nation states, which gave rise to the "unite or perish" ultimatum (a famous sentence of Aristide Briand on 1929 which means the structural incapability of confronting the fundamental problems of our times without increasingly extensive and in-depth collaboration between them), to implement a policy of European integration. At the same time, they are obstacles because their objective tendency to conserve national power pushes them to make choices that postpone *sine die* complete federation, which is invaluable to the creation of an efficient, irreversible and democratic European unity.

- This contradiction can only be overcome with the intervention of a federalist political force which is independent of governments and political parties, and therefore capable of applying democratic pressure to push governments towards making a completely federal choice which they would not otherwise, be capable of making under their own initiative. Such a force must unite all those who are in favour of European federation, have a supranational nature and also be able to effectively involve public opinion.

- The irreplaceable tool with which the federalists can impose a federal choice is *the constituent assembly*, according to the model of the Philadelphia Convention which gave rise to the American Federal Constitution. The method of the European constituent is characterised, unlike that of the intergovernmental conference, by three fundamental principles: - in the constituent, the representatives of the citizens are those who deliberate, the vast majority of them being in favour of European unification, and not governments who are compelled to defend their national power; - decisions are made with transparency and with majority voting, while the intergovernmental conference deliberates in secret and only makes decisions upon a unanimous vote; - it is possible to ratify with a majority decision which would surpass the right of national veto.

- In order for the federal choice and the constituent to be approved, the federalists must be able to exploit the deficits of efficiency (unanimous decision making on fundamental issues) and democracy (transfer of important decisions to the supranational level without the creation of a real supranational democratic system) which characterise the integration implemented by national governments, and which are destined to lead to critical situations in which the mobilisation of public opinion can impose the method of the democratic constituent.

2. From the Campaign for the European Federal Pact to that for the European Political Community (1950-1954).

In this phase of its existence, the UEF was guided by a kind of triumvirate composed of Frenchman Henry Frenay (1905-1988), the president of the German Europa Union, Eugen Kogon (1903-1987) and Spinelli, assisted by the general secretariat which was entrusted to the Italian Guglielmo Usellini (1906-1958) between 1950 and 1958. There were two fundamental federalist commitments made in that period. The first was the Campaign for the European Federal Pact. It consisted of an attempt to transform the Advisory Assembly of the Council of Europe (whose foundation had its origins in the Hague Congress) into the Constituent Assembly of the European Federation. The fundamental tool was a petition which asked the Advisory Assembly to draw up a text for a federal pact, and recommend its ratification to the member states of the Council of Europe. They would have to commit to implementing it as soon as it was ratified by a number of states comprising a total population of at least one hundred million inhabitants. During the course of 1950, the petition was signed by more than 500,000 Italian citizens, by 1/3 of 30,000 French mayors, and was adhered to in Germany by the vast majority of the population on the occasion of a series of referendums organised in collaboration with the municipal administrations of Breisach, Castrop-Rauxel, Munich, Bad-Reichenall and Traunstein.

The campaign for the federal pact did not achieve its objective, but it laid the foundations for a subsequent and rather more incisive action in this phase. It centred on art. 38 of the European Defence Community (EDC) and on the European Political Community (EPC), in which the fundamental federalist interlocutors on a governmental level were Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer and Alcide De Gasperi. When, in relation to the reconstruction of West Germany, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded upon the initiative of Jean Monnet (1888-1979), and negotiations began on the EDC, the intervention of the UEF was crucial to obtaining a connection (through art. 38 of the EDC) between the creation of a European army and the assignment of the task of drafting a project for political union to the Parliamentary Assembly of the ECSC. The EPC project, presented in March 1953, would have placed the ECSC, the EDC and the design (notably supported by the Dutch minister Jan Willem Beyen) of complete economic integration, in a framework with strongly, if not completely, federal characteristics. Its acceptance would have therefore created particularly solid foundations for rapid progress towards a federal European state. The EPC, however, was not ratified because it was inextricably linked to the EDC, which was rejected by the French National Assembly on August 30th 1954.

3. The Federalist Split Ahead of the Rome Treaties (1955-1963).

The serious crisis linked to the collapse of the EDC did not diminish, on the part of the governments of the ECSC's founding countries, the will to push forward the policy of European integration, the roots of which lay deep in the structural inadequacies of the nation states and their inability to confront fundamental problems. On the other hand, the decision prevailed to take integration forward only on an economic level, that, unlike that of political and military integration, would not immediately pose the problem of transferring fundamental aspects of sovereignty to supranational institutions. The relaunch, decided in Messina in June 1955, based on proposals by Monnet and the Benelux governments, led to the signing of the institutive treaties of the European Community for Atomic Energy (Euratom) and the European Economic Community

(EEC) in Rome on March 25th 1957. Although the objective of European federation was not indicated in the Treaties of Rome (unlike the Schuman Declaration of May 19th 1950), the conviction that guided its inspirers (particularly Monnet and Spaak) was that the advancement of economic integration would lead to the strengthening of the federal embryos (a Commission independent from national governments, community law and the role of the Court of Justice, the European Parliament whose direct election was foreseen, the gradual conversion to majority voting in the Council of Ministers) present in the community system, and therefore, would take the step from economic integration to political integration.

Ahead of this new phase of the European integration process, the federalists were divided. On the one hand, the vast majority of German federalists, led by Ernst Friedländer (1895-1973), and Dutch federalists, led by Brugmans, as well as the French “La Fédération” movement, led by André Voisin (1918-1999), maintained that it was necessary to exploit the dynamics set in motion by the new communities, particularly the EEC. The federalists had to accept a gradual realisation of their vision, and therefore had to actively support economic integration and commit themselves to strengthening the existing embryonic federal principles in the community system. The objective of the constituent assembly had to be pursued in a more advanced phase of European integration which the Treaties of Rome would lead to.

On the other hand, Spinelli (who was sustained by the majority of Italian, French and Belgian federalists) was convinced that the European Communities were not capable of making significant progress with a view to European integration. As a consequence, the federalists had to harshly criticise these government initiatives and counter them with a massive public awareness-raising campaign aimed at electing a Congress of the European People in the largest number of European towns and cities possible (inspired by the Congress of the Indian People led by Gandhi), renewing calls for a European federation, and that the constituent would be the only means of achieving it. Since the “unite or perish” ultimatum constituted an existential situation for the nation states, such federalist claims would be able to impose themselves as soon as the inadequacy of the community system became evident. Moreover, calls for federation and the constituent would have disappeared from the political agenda if the federalists had not carried out consistent action at grass roots level and if they had limited themselves to simply supporting government initiatives.

This divergence, not on fundamental principle but with regard to strategic approach, led to the break up of the UEF and to the formation of two organisations which until 1963 would both go their own separate ways. The supporters of the Brugmans-Friedländer line founded the “*Action Européenne Fédéraliste*” (AEF) in 1956, which was a coordination structure grouping together the German Europa Union, the Dutch Federalist Movement, the Fédération, the British Federal Union and other small federalist groups in Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and Italy. The Spinelli school of thought was translated, on a political and organisational level, into the transformation of the UEF into the “*Mouvement Fédéraliste Européen supranational*” (MFEs, the Supranational European Federalist Movement) in 1959. This organisation had a strongly centralised structure composed of regional sections which directly elected the European bodies, while on a national level there were only coordination commissions. The MFEs

operated above all in Italy, France and Belgium, although it was also present in Germany and was associated with the federalist groups from Switzerland, Austria and Luxembourg. The fundamental activity of Spinellian federalists consisted of gathering, between 1957 and 1962, the vote of around 640,000 citizens for the Congress of the European People, and as such, for the European Constituent.

4. The Struggle for Direct Election to the European Parliament and the Reconstitution of the UEF (1964-1973).

In 1964, the MFEs and the AEF began collaborating in a progressively more intense manner and in the end reunited in the new UEF in 1973. At the heart of this process was an evolution in the political and strategic lines of both organisations towards European Community integration.

Ahead of the success of economic integration, despite the fact that France was being led by a man like de Gaulle who was categorically against supranational unification, the federalists of the MEFs were now convinced that the Community system was rather more solid than they had originally thought at the time of the relaunch in Messina. They therefore believed that the federalist alternative should be pursued through the development of the EEC, rather than its collapse. Such an evolution, consisting of the development of the Community system's federal embryos, which would pave the way for a constituent process for federal European unity, could not however be entrusted to mere automatic developments. In order to overcome the extremely strong tendency towards the preservation of national sovereignty, which showed itself above all, but not only, in the confederalist line of de Gaulle, the federalists had to undertake a consistent and systematic public awareness campaign, drawing leverage from the contradictions deriving from the EEC's inefficiency and democratic deficiencies.

As far as the AEF federalists are concerned, they overcame their quietist confidence in the more or less automatic passage from economic to political union, and their fairly uncritical support for the Eurocrats actions and government initiatives. They effectively convinced themselves of the need for the advice work carried out with the political classes to be accompanied by a more militant action in favour of federalist principles and a solid and tenacious effort to mobilise public opinion.

The fundamental platform in which convergence and therefore the reunification of the federalists was obtained was the campaign for direct election to the European Parliament. The European election, which was foreseen by the community treaties, attempted to meet a clear need to involve the European citizens in an integration process which proceeded in a technocratic manner, and therefore called into question the principle of the democratic legitimacy. Direct election was not linked to an automatic strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament (that was why it was easier to overcome the resistance to its achievement), but it would give rise to a strong dynamic in that direction, linked to the formation of a European party-political system and the necessity to respect the commitments made in the European election campaign. In essence, the European election would open the way for federal developments through the assumption of a permanently constituent role on the part of the European Parliament.

The campaign for the European election – conducted in close collaboration with the European Movement, whose president between 1968 and 1972 was the former president of the Commission of the EEC Walter Hallstein (1901-1982) – was carried out without interruption with the undertaking of various initiatives aiming to mobilise public opinion. The most notable of which include: the “Frontier” action, promoted by the German federalists; the European Democratic Front, promoted by the French federalists; the proposed bill of popular initiative (signed by 65,000 with authenticated signatures) for the direct election of Italian representatives in the European Parliament, presented to the Senate in 1969 by the Italian MFE led by Mario Albertini (1919-1997); the demonstrations of thousands of people, organised together with the JEF, and called counter summits, in Rome in June 1967, in the Hague in December 1969 and in Paris in October 1972, in conjunction with the conferences of heads of state and the governments of the community countries held in these cities.

The struggle for direct election to the European Parliament provided the backdrop to the reconstruction of the UEF, which was announced by the Congress of Brussels held between April 13th and 15th 1973. An organisation was created which, unlike the MFEs, was founded on national organisations but which had a federal structure and was not merely an international liaison body, as the UEF and especially the AEF had been. Frenchman Etienne Hirsch (1967-1994) (1901-1994) was elected as president – he had previously been president of the Executive Commission of Euratom and he had been ousted by de Gaulle because of his federal stance, he then became president of the MFEs in 1964 – and Italian Caterina Chizzola was appointed as general secretary, remaining in the post until 1990. The preamble of the statute of the new UEF defined Kant, Hamilton and Proudhon as the fathers of federalism and indicated the following documents as its main points of reference: the directives of the Federal Union, 1939; the principles for a new Europe by the Swiss Europa Union, 1940; the Manifesto di Ventotene, 1941; the declaration of the European resistors (Resistance) of Geneva, 1944; the Hertenstein Programme, 1946; the declaration of the UEF Congress of Montreux, 1947; the political declaration of the German Europa Union Congress, 1949; the Federalist Charter, which the integral federalist let approve by the MFEs Congress in Montreux in 1964; the document approved by the MFEs Nancy Congress in 1972.

5. From Direct Election to the European Parliament to the Constitution Proposal promoted by Spinelli and the Single European Act (1974-1986).

After a decade of popular federalist campaigning in favour of direct election to the European Parliament, the Summit in Paris in December of 1974 finally declared a commitment to the achievement of this objective. The pressure applied by the federalists had been successful, and that was no coincidence, at a time of serious crisis in the European integration process. In the first half of the 1970s, the first project for economic and monetary union had failed, having been launched without taking into account, as the federalists had asked the problem of strengthening institutions on a European level. Within a context of increasing monetary instability and economic stagnation, the concrete possibility emerged that the results of economic integration obtained up until then could be wasted. Vital interests in the success of integration brought out a unitary reaction from the governments of the Community, which had

already begun to expand. It was realised that integration could not continue without the involvement of political parties and public opinion.

After obtaining a pledge to set the European election in motion, the UEF concentrated its efforts on ensuring that such a pledge was respected, and this occurred in 1979. The consultancy and support activities provided to the decision makers were accompanied by a series of public demonstrations attracting thousands of participants, the most important of which were: the demonstration in conjunction with the European Council in Rome in December 1975, where it was decided that the European election would be held even without the participation of Great Britain and Denmark (although in the end, they did take part); the demonstration in conjunction with the European Council in Brussels in June 1976, which decided the number of members of parliament to be elected. The expectations of a relaunch of the integration process raised by the decision on the European election – it should be remembered – allowed the institution of the European Monetary System, strongly desired by the French President Valérie (y)Giscard d'Estaing and by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, and firmly supported by the UEF. The EMS, creating relative monetary stability, inverted the regressive trends of economic integration.

After the 1979 election, the UEF's new scope of action was to support the European Parliament's assumption of a constituent role. In this regard, perfect synergy was created between the actions of Spinelli (who had become a MEP after having been Eurocommissioner) within the European Parliament and those of the UEF, in trying to involve citizens, political and social organisations and local authorities. Thanks to the impetus provided by Spinelli, the European Parliament, on February 14th 1984, finally approved a proposal for a constitution which contained decisive progress in a federal direction and in which, in particular, majority ratification was foreseen (as in the Constitution of Philadelphia).

The contribution of UEF (led by Albertini from 1975 to 1984 and then by Briton John Pinder(1924-2015) until 1990) to the European Parliament's initiative manifested itself with a systematic and far-reaching campaign, which is remembered here in a series of important events: a demonstration with 5,000 participants in Strasbourg on July 17th 1979 in front of the seat of the European Parliament, to coincide with its first session after its election in June; the congress of the European Movement, chaired by Giuseppe Petrilli (1918-1999) in Brussels on March 24th 1984; the demonstration coinciding with the European Council in Fointainebleau on June 25th 1984; the approval of resolutions in favour of the European Parliament's project on the part of the Italian, German and Belgian parliaments; the spectacular demonstration in Milan – its 100,000 participants make it the biggest popular demonstration in the history of the federalist struggle – in conjunction with the European Council of June 28th and 29th 1985, where the majority decided to call an Intergovernmental Conference to review to Community treaties; the demonstration in conjunction with the European Council of Luxembourg in December 1985.

The European Parliament's proposal was not accepted by the governments, but, as the president of the European Commission Jacques Delors has stated on more than one occasion, it represented a hugely important factor in the process which led to the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA was able to reset European integration in motion, partly

because (because) it initiated a phase of institutional reforms which then partially accepted the aforementioned proposal of the European Parliament.

6. The Commitment to Monetary Union and the Campaign for European Democracy (1987-1996).

With the coming into force of the SEA, the European integration process was given new impetus which culminated in the almost total realisation of the single market and with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (MT) in 1993. The MT thus paved the way for the birth of the European Union (EU), which began to extend, on an intergovernmental basis, the integration achieved thus far to fields such as foreign policy, security and defence, internal affairs and justice, and above all the process of monetary union was initiated. These developments, accompanied by significant progress on an institutional level (in particular, the strengthening of the European Parliament's powers, the extension of majority voting on the part of the Council, European citizenship), were promoted above all by the president of the European Commission Jacques Delors, by French President François Mitterrand, by German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and by Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti). Also decisive, on the other hand, was the era-defining transformation within the international system, linked to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the cold war and German reunification. The necessity, which the UEF had maintained ever since its inception, to organically connect the reconstruction of Germany to the creation of a common European sovereignty, in order to achieve definitive brotherhood between the French and the Germans and all Europeans, in effect represented a fundamental factor in the progress made in the integration process during the 1990s.

The role played by the UEF must be viewed within this context. After John Pinder, the organisation appointed the Italian Francesco Rossolillo (1937-2005) as president from 1990 to 1997, and Dutchman Gerard Vissels succeeded Caterina Chizzola as general secretary. The most general and comprehensive commitment undertaken was that of the Campaign for European Democracy carried out between 1987 and 1996.

If the basic objective was (as always) European federation and a democratic constituent method, the concrete demands through which the campaign was articulated were the following:

- eliminate border controls between the countries of the European Union;
- parallelism between widening and deepening;
- strengthening of the roles of the European Parliament and the European Commission, extension of majority voting;
- the removal of governmental monopoly over the constituent function.

The most relevant aspects of the Campaign for European Democracy were: the gathering of signatures in order to petition the European authorities; the systematic presence of thousands of demonstrators to coincide with the most important European Councils (Brussels 1987, Hanover 1988, Strasbourg 1989, Rome 1990, Maastricht 1991, Edinburgh 1992, Turin and Florence 1996); the consultative referendum on the constituent role of the European Parliament, which was requested by the federalists by means of a bill of popular initiative (with 120,000 authenticated signatures) and which

was held in Italy in conjunction with the European elections of June 18th 1989 (88% voting yes, with an 82% turn out); the support of the ratification of the MT and the particularly active intervention in the problematic referendum held in France on September 20th 1992.

Within the framework of the Campaign for European Democracy, the federalists, who ever since the 1960s had expressed their support for a European currency (for example, the “frontier-action” of 1968 was dedicated to this issue), carried out a specific action in order to encourage the participation of the largest possible number of EU member states to the monetary union. At the heart of this commitment was the consideration that the single currency would make the need for a democratic European government more urgent than ever.

7. The Campaign for the European Constitution (1997-2007).

The UEF’s president between 1997 and 2005 was German Jo Leinen, and the position of general secretary was occupied by Frenchman Bruno Boissiere. In 2005, Italian Mercedes Bresso became president and Austrian Friedhelm Frischenschlager general secretary. Beginning with the Congress of Vienna from April 18th to 20th 1997, the Federal European Constitution and the European Constituent, which have always been the guiding lights of the federal struggle, became the subjects of a specific campaign which constitutes the thread linking the actions carried out in this phase . At the base of this choice is the conviction that the EU, due to the level of integration achieved and the problems which emerged from the post-bipolar world, finds itself facing existential challenges. The construction of a European federation, indicated in the Schuman Declaration, and therefore the activation of a democratic constituent procedure, are the essential conditions for avoiding a slide towards a divided and impotent Europe. The existential challenges are fundamentally: the urgent need to integrate monetary union with supranational social and economic government; enlargement, which is destined to stall and ultimately fail without an intensification of activities aimed at creating effective solidarity between the more and less advanced countries; the necessity for the EU to be able to act effectively on an international level (which implies complete federalisation of security, defence and foreign policies) in order to make a significant contribution to the creation of a fairer and more peaceful world.

On the basis of this perception, the Campaign for the Federal European Constitution enjoyed a moment of particular strength with the demonstration of December 7th in Nice (in conjunction with the European Council) in which 10,000 people, including hundreds of local administrators, participated. The governments responded to the requests of the federalists and of the European Parliament by summoning a European Convention, chaired by Giscard d’Estaing. In this way, certain aspects of the democratic constituent model were acknowledged: the participation of both national and European members of parliament (already tested with the formulation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights passed in Nice); the transparency of meetings; consideration of the views of civil society. However, the principle of unanimous final decision making on the part of the governments and of unanimous ratification was maintained. The federalists made every effort to favour the approval of an as advanced as possible constitution project and deemed the final proposal to be unsatisfactory, but one which nevertheless contained

important steps forward towards federalism and democratic participation, and therefore a milestone from which to immediately move forward. They therefore expressed themselves strongly in favour of its ratification, although this was prevented by the negative result of referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, even if ratification was obtained from a majority of member states and a majority of the population of the EU.

After the impasse of 2005 the UEF tried to relaunch the constituent process. Since it is the principle of unanimous decision making, i.e. the right to national veto, which prevents the progress which is so urgently needed, the decision taken concentrated on solving this crucial conundrum. The strategic objective of the campaign at this stage was to have the Constitution project (rewritten and improved, taking into account the results of the French and Dutch referendums) subjected to a European consultative referendum to be held on the same day as the 2009 European Elections, and that it should come into force, in the ratifying countries, if it was approved by the majority of both the member states and the population of the EU.

At the end of 2007, the governments responded to the federalist demands – these were also backed up by a signature campaign, which, however, ran out of time before reaching its full potential – by signing the Lisbon Treaty whose formal entry into force was scheduled for the end of 2009. This still contained, albeit in a somewhat watered-down form (and with additional derogation clauses to meet demands from the Czechs, Irish and Polish), the main reforms included in the Constitutional Treaty, but all reference, even symbolic, to the concept of constitution had been erased. This had been done with the precise intention of reducing, as far as possible, any expectations that the process of institutional change in a federal direction might rapidly be resumed. In short, the institutional system resulting from the process that began immediately after the monetary union came into force contains some federal characteristics. I refer, in particular, to the relative autonomy of the Commission, the supremacy of Community law guaranteed by the European Court of Justice, the role of the directly elected EP, and the use of majority voting for some of the decisions taken by the Council of the Ministers. However it is also weighed down by many other features that constitute a hard core of a stubbornly confederal nature, namely: the need for unanimous decisions in key areas (finance, foreign, security and defence policy and institutional reforms), the right of secession, and the fact that the EU's true government is a body, the European Council, that can be likened to the congresses of the Holy Alliance.